Copper Soldiers forging new roles for the Chilean Military by Flammia, Roberto R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-09
Copper Soldiers forging new roles for the Chilean Military
Flammia, Roberto R.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 










 Thesis Advisor:   Harold Trinkunas 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
i 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Copper Soldiers: Forging New Roles for the Chilean   
Military  
6. AUTHOR(S)  Roberto R. Flammia 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
United States Air Force Academy 
USAFA, CO 80840 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Thesis explains why Chile maintains military budgets in excess of its threat levels.  Historically, Chile 
required a well-funded and capable military due to tense regional relations.  However, resolution of border 
conflicts, equipment acquisitions and superior economic performance reduced Chile's threats during the 1990's.  
Nonetheless, analysts attributed the continued high military budgets to an authoritarian hangover following 
General Pinochet's reign (1973-1989).   
Pinochet's 1998 arrest and trial diminished the power of the military, calling into question past 
explanations.  The judiciary purged the state of junta era commanders, younger more flexible leadership came to 
power and the political parties agreed on constitutional reform.  Yet, after sweeping constitutional reforms, 
budgets remained high.   
This thesis argues the government maintained defense budgets in order to further the "normalization" of 
civil-military relations.  The military received high budgets and in turn recognized past human right abuses and 
pledged subordination.  With relations stable, both the civilian elite and military agreed to reorient the military's 
mission towards peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping reinforces civil-military relations while benefiting each party 
individually.  The civilian elite receive international prestige furthering their foreign policy goals while the 
military's mission and budgets are justified.  The stable equilibrium guarantees Chile will remain a regional leader 
in peacekeeping for the future.   
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
81 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Chile, Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping Operations, PKOs, Pinochet, Civil-
Military Reform, Constitutional Reform, 1980 Constitution, Military Budgets 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iii




COPPER SOLDIERS: FORGING NEW ROLES FOR THE CHILEAN 
MILITARY 
 
Roberto R. Flammia 
Second Lieutenant, United States Air Force 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Robert R. Flammia 
 
 




































This thesis explains why Chile maintains military budgets in excess of its threat 
levels.  Historically, Chile required a well-funded and capable military due to tense 
regional relations.  However, resolution of border conflicts, equipment acquisitions and 
superior economic performance reduced Chile's threats during the 1990's.  Nonetheless, 
analysts attributed the continued high military budgets to an authoritarian hangover 
following General Pinochet's reign (1973-1989).   
Pinochet's 1998 arrest and trial diminished the power of the military, calling into 
question past explanations.  The judiciary purged the state of junta era commanders, 
younger more flexible leadership came to power and the political parties agreed on 
constitutional reform.  Yet, after sweeping constitutional reforms, budgets remained high.   
This thesis argues the government maintained defense budgets in order to further 
the "normalization" of civil-military relations.  The military received high budgets and in 
turn recognized past human right abuses and pledged subordination.  With relations 
stable, both the civilian elite and military agreed to reorient the military's mission towards 
peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping reinforces civil-military relations while benefiting each 
party individually.  The civilian elite receive international prestige furthering their foreign 
policy goals while the military's mission and budgets are justified.  The stable 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. FRAMEWORK 
Why does Chile maintain high military budgets despite a reduced threat 
environment?  Historically, the former enemy Peruvian and Bolivian militaries and the 
aggressive Argentine forces required a capable and well-funded Chilean military.  
However, resolution of border conflicts, reduction in defense spending by neighbors and 
superior economic performance following Chile’s transition to democracy reduced the 
threat environment during the 1990’s.  Conventional wisdom attributed Chile's high 
defense expenditures to spending guarantees embedded in the 1980 constitution and an 
authoritarian hangover following General Pinochet's reign.   Many felt, as long as the 
military retained power and autonomy, defense spending would remain high.   
Pinochet’s arrest and trial in 1998 and the resulting political upheaval diminished 
the power of the military and calls past explanations into question.  A resurgent judiciary 
prosecuted junta era commanders for human rights violations.  Younger more flexible 
military leadership replaced Pinochet and his cronies.  The parties of the right distanced 
themselves from the armed forces.  The Concertación allied with the right in order to 
eradicate the “authoritarian enclaves” from the 1980 constitution and eliminate the 
political power of the military.  Nonetheless, military spending guarantees remained 
embedded in the constitution and budgets have reached their highest levels ever.  Since 
Chile has recovered from its authoritarian hangover, why does the government continue 
to fund the military in excess of its threat environment?   
This thesis argues the civilians maintained high military budgets to further the 
“normalization” of civil-military relations in the wake of Pinochet’s arrest and trial.  The 
new military leadership admitted to human rights abuses and assured subordination to the 
civilian government.  In return, the civilian elite omitted the spending guarantees from 
the 2005 constitutional reforms.  The military enjoys high budgets and the government, 
improved civil-military relations. 
With defense budgets guaranteed, the government reoriented the military’s 
mission to focus on peacekeeping operations (PKOs).  The civilian elite supported PKOs 
2as they increase civil-military dialogue, military subordination and Chile’s international 
presence.  The armed forces supported the measure as PKOs increase budgets, personnel 
pay and morale while providing material and cross-training incentives.  Benefiting both 
parties, Chile’s peacekeeping commitment increased from a few observers in 1998 to 
over 600 deployed military personnel by 2005.  The continued improvement of relations 
in the region, secure budgets and benefits of PKOs establish peacekeeping as a 
sustainable military mission for Chile’s future.   
Chapter II supports this argument by examining Chile’s current threat 
environment and military budgets.  The chapter analyzes regional developments and 
defense expenditures over the last fifteen years.  Traditionally, Chile maintained high 
budgets due to a siege mentally propagated by expansive and hostile borders with Peru, 
Argentina and Bolivia.  Yet, consistent economic growth, military hardware upgrades, 
and resolution of border disputes since the transition to democracy reduced the external 
threat.  Nonetheless, Chilean military budgets continue to increase.  Currently, Chile 
dedicates a higher percentage of its GDP to military expenditures than any other Latin 
American state.   
Chapter III examines political explanations for the high levels of military 
spending since the transition to democracy.  From 1990-1998, budget guarantees written 
into General Pinochet’s 1980 constitution kept defense spending high.  Although the 
Concertación would have preferred to eliminate these constitutional provisions, the 
coalition lacked the numbers in Congress to do so.  Parties of the right, closely linked to 
the military, impeded reform.  In 1998 Pinochet’s London arrest unleashed a massive 
civil-military shakeup. Prosecutions for human rights abuses ignited, the military image 
plummeted and the right distanced themselves from their long time ally the armed forces.  
The Concertación coalition capitalized on the events, allying with the newly reformist 
right to amend the “authoritarian enclaves” in the 1980 constitution.  After “completing” 
the constitutional reforms, constitutional spending guarantees remained and military 
budgets reached the highest levels ever.   
The lack of budget reform can be explained by civilian desires not to upset an 
incipient process of “normalization” of civil-military relations.  The political isolation of 
3the military in the wake of Pinochet’s arrest initiated a shift in military leadership away 
from officers associated with human rights prosecutions leading to a process in which the 
armed forces publicly acknowledged its infamous past and declared its subordination to 
civilian authorities.  Civilians, in return, undertook no measures to reduce defense 
spending during the process of constitutional reform.   
Is this situation of high levels of defense spending and military subordination to 
civilian rule a stable equilibrium?  Or should we expect civilians to reduce spending in 
the near future?  Chapter IV answers these questions by examining Chile’s increased 
involvement in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since 1998.  It shows how both civilian 
and military benefits from PKOs can be used to justify high levels of defense spending. 
For the armed forces, increased budgets and personal pay, institutional justification, 
morale and international interaction result.  Civilians derive increased civil-military 
dialogue, military subordination, and a global presence.  While both profit exclusively, a 
stable and predictable civil-military environment based on high military budgets emerges. 
Chapter V addresses the policy implications of these findings for the United 
States.  It argues that the United States should recognize and promote Chilean PKOs in 
order to catalyze civil-military reforms and fortify one of Latin America’s strongest 
democracies.  Additionally, as seen by the purchase of General Dynamics F-16s, the 
Chileans provide a viable weapons market.  Weapons sales bolster peacekeeping 
capabilities as well as increase Chilean interoperability with the United States and the 
United Nations.  Lastly, exchanges of information and training should increase.  
Improvements in peacekeeping doctrine and capabilities reinforce Chile’s regional leader 
status.  As seen by the Latin American led deployment in Haiti, increased responsibility 
and capability in PKOs from Latin American states reduces US military requirements.  
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5II. REGIONAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND CHILEAN 
DEFENSE SPENDING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter demonstrates that Chile continues to expand and modernize its 
military forces despite a reduction in regional threats.  Historically experiencing a 
“surrounded” mentality, Chile maintained a relatively high level of defense spending.  
Facing the larger Argentine military, the previously vanquished Peruvian forces and a 
landlocked and desperate Bolivia, Chile remained on the defensive.  Yet, recent shifts in 
military budgets and capabilities of former adversaries as well as decreased regional 
tensions challenge longstanding Chilean assumptions.  The once powerful Argentine 
military now struggles with harsh austerity measures due to the nation’s economic 
collapse.1  Peru and Bolivia currently maintain combined defense budgets 36% smaller 
than Chile’s alone.2  Over the last twenty years Chile resolved all but one border dispute 
with its neighbors.  Regardless, Chile continues to modernize its forces, spending more 
on defense as a percentage of GDP than any other Latin American state.3   
The first section of this chapter shows that Chilean budgets are growing faster and 
are more stable than its neighbors.  The second section proves the Chilean armed forces 
are qualitatively and technologically superior and maintain a more aggressive pattern of 
arms acquisitions.  Section three demonstrates Chile’s economic stability and increases in 
GDP and competitiveness outpace the region.  Finally, the fourth area illustrates the 
reduction in border tensions by reviewing past disputes and their successful negotiations.  
The multiple angles of analysis prove Chilean defense expenditures do not match the 
diminishing threat environment. 
 
 
                                                 
1  “External Affairs, Chile,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-South America [journal on-line]; 
available from http://www4.janes.com; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005. 
2  “Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” The Military Balance 2004-2005, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), 335-339. 
3  “Executive Summary: Risk Pointers,” 2005 Jane’s Information Group [database on-line] available 
from http://www4.janes.com/; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005. 
6B. MILITARY BUDGETS 
According to the 2004-2005 The Military Balance, Chilean defense expenditures 
totaled $1.4 billion (U.S.) in 2004.4  In contrast, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia’s 2004 
expenditures totaled $1.6 billion, $899 million, and $126 million respectively.5  Summed 
together, the border countries’ defense expenditures total $2.625 billion.  With Argentina 
outspending Chile alone, the neighbors collectively spent more than $1.225 billion or 
1.875 times Chile’s entire budget in 2004. Taken at face value, Chile seems to be at a 
large disadvantage.   
Chile’s budgetary disadvantages become much less alarming when viewed in the 
long term.  During Pinochet’s sixteen and a half year reign defense budgets averaged 
17.39%.6  Outlays reached their highest levels in 1975, consuming 23.71% of 
government expenditures7  Following Pinochet’s departure, Chilean defense expenditures 
dipped in terms of GDP percentile, but increased in total value.  As proof, Chile’s defense 
budget in terms of US dollars over the last twelve years averaged $1.53 billion.8  The 
2004 budget represented the highest budget in the last four years and a second year of 
increase.9  From 1993 to 2004 total military expenditures increased by 40%, or 3.33% 
annually.10  In terms of the U.S. dollar, the Chilean budget maintains a slow but stable 
growth pattern trending towards future increases. 
An analysis of the Chilean military budget in Chilean pesos (pCH) reveals an 
even stronger trend.  According to the 2002 Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile 
produced by the Minister of Defense, between 1993 and 2001 fiscal defense expenditures 
increased nine out of eleven straight years (expressed in 2001 pesos).11  During the same 
span, pCH expenditures rose 31% percent, capped off in 2001 with the highest budgetary 
                                                 
4  “Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” 2004-2005, 336. 
5  Ibid., 335-339. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
8  “Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” The Military Balance 1993-1994 through 2004-2005, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1993-2005). 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, Libro de la Defensa Nacionale de Chile, (Santiago: May 
2003), 207-208 
7levels in 13 years.12  Also, following a five year decrease in expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP after the electoral defeat of Pinochet in 198913 (-.87%), expenditures increased 
for five of the six years between 1996 and 2001 (.13%).14  Collectively, the pCH based 
figures reveal a stable and robust increase in absolute and GDP percentage defense 
spending over the last thirteen and six years respectively. 
Chile’s secure spending patterns gain significance when compared to the military 
expenditures of Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia over the same period.  Argentina’s spending 
habits over the last twelve years are erratic at best.  Increasing from a low of $2.5 billion 
in 1993, expenditures rose for six straight years, peaking at $4 billion in 1998.15  
Following 1998, military outlays dropped for four straight years, reduced to $1.1 billion 
in 2002, a decrease of 72.5% in five years.16  Between 2001 and 2002 alone (years when 
Argentina was reeling from the recent currency crash17) expenses dropped by a stunning 
66%.  Resultantly, Chilean expenditures eclipsed Argentina’s in 2002 even though Chile 
had a GDP of $67 billion compared to Argentina’s of $101 billion the same year.18  
Following 2002, Argentine spending steadied at $1.6 billion, placing it $1.325 billion or 
46% below the twelve year average.19   
In Peru, from 1993 to 2004 defense expenditures remain relatively unchanged.  
The Peruvian defense budget averaged $848 million during that period.20  Relatively 
stable, nine of the twelve budgets remained within +/- $100 million of the average.  The 
2004 budget remains consistent at $899 million, $51 million above the average.  Also, 
                                                 
12  Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, Libro de la Defensa Nacionale de Chile, (Santiago: May 
2003), 207-208 
13  Eduardo Silva, “Chile Past, Present and Future: The Long Road to National Reconciliation” 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol 33, no.4 (Winter 1991), 133. [journal on-line]; 
available from http://links.jstor.org; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005. 
14  Libro, 207-208 
15   “Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” The Military Balance 1993-1994 through 2004-2005. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Jeffrey Sachs and Felipe Larrain, “Why Dollarization is More Straitjacket Than Salvation,” 
Foreign Policy, no. 116 (Autumn, 1999), 80-92 {journal on-line] available from http://links.jstor.org; 
Internet; accessed 13 March 2005. 
18  Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” The Military Balance 1993-1994 through 2004-2005. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
82004 outlay appears to be trending back towards the twelve year standard as it is part of a 
four year decline in military spending.21   This latest trend and the past twelve years of 
data demonstrates Peru’s adherence to steady low-level defense spending without major 
swings positive or negative. 
The Bolivian defense budget follows a generally Argentine pattern with less 
radical shifts.  Averaging $141 million over twelve years, defense expenditures generally 
increased between 1994 and 1999 before falling off between 2000 and 2004.  The most 
significant swing occurred between 1999 and 2000 when defense levels fell $90 million 
or 41% in a single year.22  Following the decline, the budget steadied out, averaging $127 
million from 2001-2004, a 10% decrease from the twelve year average.23  Thus, Bolivia, 
like Argentina, enjoyed a dramatic rise in military expenditures near the turn of the 
century, experienced a rapid decline shortly thereafter and now spends significantly 
below past levels.   
Combined, the data from the four countries brings to light a comforting trend for 
Chilean defense experts.  With Argentina, and Bolivia stabilizing military spending after 
large drop offs and Peru continuing a strict average, the Chilean defense outlays grew 
significantly in relative strength.  In 2000, combined Argentine, Peruvian, and Bolivian to 
Chilean expenditures equaled a ratio of 3.54 to 1 ($US).24  By 2005, the shifts in budgets 
reduced the disparity to 1.88 to 1.25  The variance in ratios equates to a 47% decrease in 
relative military outputs in the last four years alone.  Furthermore, measured in both U.S. 
dollars and Chilean Pesos, upward trends for Chilean spending appear to be the norm.  
While the other countries continue to experience wild swings or stagnant expenditures, 
Chile maintains a stable upward climb.  The large increase in Chilean military 
expenditures vis-à-vis its neighbors significantly decreases the regional threat 
environment. 
 
                                                 
21  Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” The Military Balance 1993-1994 through 2004-2005. Ibid.  
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24  “Caribbean and Latin America,” The Military Balance 2000-2001, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 2000). 227,230, 233, 247. 
25  “Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” 2004-2005, 335-339. 
91. Timing of Major Equipment Acquisitions 
Another factor to consider when examining the recent budget data is timing of 
major equipment acquisitions.  Prior to 2001, no Latin American country over the last 23 
years received advanced weaponry from the United States (with the exception of 24 early 
B model F-16’s to Venezuela in 1982).26  The lull in advanced weaponry sales resulted 
from a ban initiated in 1977 under President Jimmy Carter.  Titled “Presidential Decision 
Directive 13,” it enacted a “‘presumption of denial’ of request for attack jets and other 
high technology items for the Latin American States.”27  Strictly enforced for twenty 
years, Presidential Directive 13 kept weapons levels and technologies relatively low in 
the region.28 
In 1997, however, President Clinton broke with the policy and Chile has been the 
main beneficiary.  Begun under Clinton and finalized in May 2001 under President Bush, 
Chile signed a contract for ten General Dynamics F-16 “Fighting Falcons."  In January 
2002, President Lagos formalized the $660 million purchase.29  The F-16’s provided 
Chile the only US made advanced weaponry in the region in nearly two decades.30 
The shift in U.S. policy is important for the regional balance of power for many 
reasons.  First, the 2001 shift in weapons policy occurred after the Bolivian defense 
budget decline of 1999 and during the 2001-2002 nosedive in Argentina.  With both 
countries wrestling for control of their military budgets, neither possessed sufficient 
resources to update their outdated weapons systems with American arms.  Second, Peru, 
which maintains a constant budget, previously committed to purchasing MiG 29’s from 
Belarus in 1995.31  Looking outside the hemisphere for advanced weapons sales, the 
                                                 
26  Dr. Frank Mora and LtCol Antonio L. Palá, “US Army Transfer Policy for Latin America: Lifting 
the Ban on Fighter Aircraft,” Aerospace Power Journal, available from 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/spr99/mora.html; Internet; accessed 15 
February 2005. 
27  Thomas Cardamone, “Arms Sales to Latin America,” Foreign Policy in Focus: Council for a 
Livable World, vol 2, num 53 (December 1997) available from http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol2/ 
v2n53arm_body.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2005. 
 
28  Ibid. 
29  “External Affairs, Chile,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-South America. 
30  Ibid. 
31  “Caribbean and Latin America: Part II,” 2002-2003, 316. 
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Peruvians acted prior to the modification of American policy.  The bottom line is that 
Chile’s growing military spending comes at a time when its armed forces can access the 
most advanced weapons while regional adversaries cannot. 
C. MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
When evaluating regional military capabilities a similar pattern emerges.  Viewed 
at a surface level, Chile’s military appears greatly outmatched.  Argentine, Peruvian, and 
Bolivian forces and equipment levels are many times of those of Chile.  However, 
analysis of qualitative factors, weapons capabilities and patterns of recent acquisitions tell 
a different story.  Not only are Chilean weapons capabilities currently superior than any 
single neighbor, but future threats to their superiority appear unlikely. 
1. Force Equipment Levels  
From a general overview the Chilean military appears greatly outmatched.  Chile 
maintains 77,700 combined forces with 50,000 reserves.32  In contrast, Argentina, Peru, 
and Bolivia maintain forces of 71,400, 80,000, and 31,500 respectively.33  Additionally, 
Peru maintains 188,000 reserves.34  Taken at face value Chile’s neighbors command 
235% more active duty forces and 375% more reserves.   
Breaking down the militaries in components proves equally as problematic for the 
Chilean military.  In terms of Army equipment (measured in main battle tanks [MBT’s] 
and light tanks [LT’s]) Chile employs 290 Leopard I and 60 AMX-30 MBT’s with no 
LT’s.35  Opposite Chile, Argentina maintains a force of 200 MBT’s and 150 LT’s.36   
Peru maintains 275 MBT’s and 110 LT’s.37  Bolivia is without a MBT force, but 
maintains 36 LT’s.  Combined, Chile’s rivals employ more than 1.5 times Chile’s MBT 
force (1.63: 1) and 296 more LT’s.  
Naval estimates are equally problematic for Chile.  In 2005, Chile’s navy consists 
of two submarines, two destroyers, four frigates and twenty four patrol and coastal 
                                                 
32  “Caribbean and Latin America,” The Military Balance 2004-2005, 201. 
33  Ibid., 196-213. 
34  Ibid., 213. 
35  Ibid., 202. 
36  Ibid., 197. 
37  Ibid., 214. 
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combatant craft.38  The other three nations collectively maintain nine submarines, five 
destroyers, twelve frigates and eight four patrol and coast combatant craft.39  With 
significant advantages in the numbers of submarines, destroys, frigates, and patrol boats, 
the three nations quantitatively outmatch Chile’s navy. 
Finally, Chile’s Air Force appears overwhelmed as well.  In 2004, Chile 
maintained 85 combat aircraft.  Of them, the most notable were the 13 Gen II Mirage 
50’s, 18 Gen III F-5’s and 18 Gen II A-37B’s.40  In contrast, Argentina maintained 99 
combat aircraft (7 Gen III, 72 Gen II), Peru 118 (32 Gen IV, 57 Gen III, 23 Gen II), and 
Bolivia 37 (Gen II).41  When summed, Chile maintains less Gen IV aircraft (-32), fewer 
Gen III models (-46), and significantly fewer Gen II fighters (-97).  Quantitatively, all 
three force components of the neighboring states outmatch each branch of the Chilean 
military. 
2. Technological and Qualitative Advantages 
Despite the quantitative disadvantage, analysis of weapon system and qualitative 
capabilities tells a different story.  The Chilean Army maintains a reputation of “near 
invincibility” throughout the region.42  Continually threatened by neighbors, the army 
developed “a high caliber, disciplined, Prussian-trained Army.”43  Never defeated in a 
short run of wars, the motto “Siempre Vencedor, Jamás Vencido” (Always Victorious, 
Never Defeated) echoes reality.44   As such, the quality of the Chilean army remains 
“unquestionably the best in Latin America…approached in quality only by those other 
regional armies on which it has had a strong formative influence.”45   
Technologically outdated in the past, the regimented Chilean Army leapt forward 
with the 1999 purchase of 290 Leopard 1 MBT’s.  According to Jane’s, “purchases of 
                                                 
38  “Caribbean and Latin America,” The Military Balance 2004-2005, 202. 
39  Ibid., 197-213. 
40  Ibid., 202. 
41  Ibid., 197-213. 
42  “Army, Chile,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-South America [journal on-line]; available 
from http://www4.janes.com/; Internet; accessed 13 March 2005. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
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Leopard 1 tanks from Germany and the Netherlands give the Chilean Army a formidable, 
if long needed, main battle tank force by regional standards.”46  The potent Leopards 
combined with the disciplined operators constitute a regionally potent force.   
Chile’s navy, like their army, enjoys a high level of competence.  Trained by the 
British, Chile boasts “the strongest naval tradition in Latin America.”47  Building on the 
tradition, Chile developed forces that “remain unmatched on a qualitative basis.”48  As 
such, “the ships are well maintained and, more importantly, crewed by very well trained 
teams of officers and ratings.”49  In contrast, Argentina’s aircraft carrier El 25 de Mayo, 
barely floats.  Since 1988 it has not even left port.50  Recently, “only a defence-ministry 
veto spared the navy the indignity of seeing its former pride converted into a floating 
shopping mall for Buenos Aires.”51  When comparing Chile’s well maintained and 
staffed fleet to its neighbors’ decrepit forces, it is no surprise Chile’s navy ranks as the 
“best in the region.”  
In terms of technology and capabilities, Chile remains a formidable force.  Facing 
the larger navies of Peru and Argentina, Chile aims for highly capable forces.  The 
submarine fleet, while small, is very modern.  The main backbone, two new Franco-
Spanish Scorpene class submarines, will be introduced in 2005 and 2006.  Once 
commissioned, the new subs “will be the most powerful vessels of this type in service in 
South America.”52  Also, the navy purchases physically modern, but technologically 
outdated U.S. and European equipment and refurbishes it.  The domestic companies 
DESA and SIDEF specialize in “electronic and digital systems upgrading” in order to 
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update hardware to current standards.53  The end result is a technologically “balanced and 
effective fleet,”54 superior to regional rivals.55 
Lastly, Chile’s Air Force enjoys strong qualitative and technological advantages 
in line with the other services.  The Fuerzas Aereas de Chile (FACh) are the “fourth 
oldest independent military air arm” in the world.56  Extremely proud of this tradition, the 
FACh maintains “a well-trained and motivated force.”57  In addition to the “superb 
morale,” the FACh claims “extensive experience in operating aircraft in a variety of 
hostile environments.”58  The end result is a high level of esprit de corps and operational 
experience. 
Technologically, the Air Force stands out also.  Making sustained efforts to 
modernize their forces after the international boycott of the Chilean Military Government 
from 1973-1990,59 the FACh continues an aggressive acquisition schedule.  Recent 
purchases of the ten General Dynamics F-16 “Fighting Falcons” replace the aging Mirage 
III fleet.  A generation IV platform, 60 the F-16’s ensures air superiority against even 
Peru’s MIG-29’s.61  Geoffrey Wawro, professor of strategic studies in the Naval War 
College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, states, “If Peru scrambled warplanes to 
protest Chilean encroachment on its maritime frontier, the Chilean F-16’s…would fly 
rings around them, at the very least.”62  In addition to the F-16’s, further plans to replace 
the aging Northrop F-5E “Tiger III” force are underway.  If on schedule, Chile’s next 
generation of Air Superiority Fighter should be secured between 2010 and 2012.63  The 
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future acquisition of air assets joined with the already potent F-16’s will consolidate 
further the FACh’s technologically dominant position. 
Thus, the Chilean Army, Navy, and Air Force historically and currently outmatch 
Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia on a technological and qualitative level.  While the other 
nations continue with austerity measures, recent Chilean purchases combined with 
qualitative advantages ensure military dominance.  The rise in Chilean military prowess 
vis-à-vis the other nations greatly reduces the nations threat environment. 
3. Patterns of Acquisition 
The last military area to examine is that of weapon system acquisitions over the 
last ten years.  Recent patterns in Chilean acquisitions reveal a consistent and inter-
service acquisition of new hardware.  In contrast, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia maintain a 
“trickle” approach for purchases/upgrades, often neglecting entire services for years at a 
time.  When analyzed in context with the already technologically and qualitatively 
superior Chilean military, current and future acquisition projects further distance Chile 
from the pack. 
Argentina’s weapon system acquisitions proceed at a slow rate.  In 1996 the 
nation bought eight Bell UH-1H “Huey” helicopters and eight P-3B Orion naval 
aircraft.64  In 1997, Argentina added eight more “Huey’s” and eight used A-4M’s from 
the U.S.  In 1998, Argentina completed its last major acquisition when it purchased a 
single KC-135 from the United States.65  Between 1998 and 2005 the Argentines 
purchased no new or significant hardware for any service.  The sparse purchases, with the 
exception of the dated A-4’s, added little offensive capability to the Argentine military 
over the last ten years. 
Peru and Bolivia acquisitions over the last decade mimic Argentina’s gradual 
pattern.  Bolivia’s last major acquisition occurred in 1997 when it bought 18 American 
TA-4J fighter/ground attack aircraft.  Of the 18, Bolivia designated six as “can birds” to 
be used for spare parts.66  Peru, after a spending blitz in 1995 (18 SU-25’s and 18 MIG-
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29’s from Belarus), purchased almost no new equipment over the next ten years.67  The 
only exceptions occurred in 1998 with the purchase of three more MIG-29’s and two 
Lupo-class frigates from Italy.68  Peru and Bolivia, like Argentina, refused or were 
unable to acquire new advanced weapon systems throughout the late 1990’s and early 
twenty first century. 
On the flip side, Chile continues to aggressively and consistently acquire new 
hardware. In 1995, Chile purchased 128 M-113 armored personnel carriers from 
Belgium.69  In 1996, Chile purchased 60 AMX-30B main battle tanks from France.70  In 
1997, Chile purchased two Tiger fast patrol craft with surface-surface missiles and the 
two Scorpene submarines.71  In 1998 Chile purchased twelve Sikorsky UH-60 
“Blackhawk” helicopters, and two Orion P-3 aircraft.72  In 2000, Chile ordered its 
vaunted Block 50 General Dynamics F-16’s and in 2004 the government purchased four 
advanced frigates from the Netherlands.73  The consistent acquisition pattern continues to 
replenish stocks of aging Chilean hardware well in advance of its neighbors. 
 Comparing the two sides, Chile is the only state to purchase major weapon 
systems consistently over the last ten years and the only one to do so at all during this 
century.  Furthermore, Chile blanketed all the services with new equipment (MX-30, F-
16, Scorpene submarines, Frigates, UH-60’s, etc) while other countries provided 
patchwork upgrades.  Specifically, Argentina refurbished old A-4’s (AF), Peru purchased 
a couple of frigates and a few MIG-29’s (AF/Navy) and Bolivia refurbished A-4’s (AF).  
Moreover, Chile’s acquisitions such as the Scorpene class submarines and U.S. F-16’s 
are without peer in the other countries.  In contrast, Argentina’s KC-135 or Peru’s Lupo  
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class frigates are matched or exceed by past Chilean purchases.  Collectively, the 
acquisition patterns reveal a growing gap between Chile’s improving military and its 
torpid competitors. 
4. Implications for the Regional Threat Environment 
In arguing in favor of a hostile Chilean threat environment, critics may cite 
Chile’s quantitative deficit.  Numerically inferior in terms of military personnel, main 
battle tanks, naval units, and combat aircraft, the Chileans appear outgunned.  Yet, deeper 
analysis of the Chilean situation reveals a much different picture.  Technologically, recent 
weapon systems upgrades give the Chileans a clear-cut advantage.  Technologically 
superior, Chile’s advantages swells when taking into account qualitative factors.  With 
the most efficient navy in the region, the most disciplined army, and a highly trained air 
force, Chile service members are head and shoulders above their regional peers.  
Additionally, trends in recent and current acquisitions reinforce Chile’s dominant 
position.  In fact, El Mercurio, a leading Chilean newspaper, predicts if the military 
budgets remain at current levels, Chile will reach military capabilities equal to or 
exceeding European nations by 2010.74  Hence, Chile’s security in the region, from a 
defense perspective, appears safe for the near future. 
D. THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC BALANCE 
The third area of analysis is the economic strength, trends, and competitiveness 
among the four nations.  Chile is outmatched in terms of total GDP.  Chile’s GDP totaled 
$93.47 billion in 2005 compared with Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia’s GDP’s of $161 
billion, $70 billion, and $10 billion, respectively.75  Collectively, the three nations’ GDP 
outpace Chile’s by $241 billion or 258%.  However, the quality and sustainability of 
Chilean economic growth is much more consistent than any of its neighbors and provides 
a foundation for its military power. 
1. GDP Growth 
Chile’s economic power appears to be a disadvantage only when analyzed in pure 
numbers.  Analysis of the GDP growth patterns reveals positive trends for Chile.  In U.S 
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dollars, Chile’s GDP increased from $33.5 billion in 1990 to $93.47 billion in 2005.76  
The fifteen year rise in GDP totaled $60 billion, a 297% increase.77  During the same 
period Chile significantly shrunk the gap in GDP ratios in terms of Chilean GDP ($) : 
Argentina, Peruvian, Bolivian GDP.  In 1990, the ratio sat at $1 to $6.2.  By 2005, Chile 
the gap contracted to $1 to $3.6 -- a 42% decrease. 
Chile’s gains become more impressive when compared to those of the other three 
nations. During the same 1990-2005 timeframe Argentina’s GDP increased from $141 
billion to $161 billion.  Although reaching nearly $300 billion in 1998, the 2001 crash 
reduced total 1990-2005 gains to 14%.  Peru’s and Bolivia’s GDP’s grew similar to 
Chile’s, but at a more moderate rates.  From 1990-2005, Peru’s and Bolivia’s GDP’s 
increased by $42 billion and $4.8 billion respectively.  In percentiles, the gains equaled 
250% and 200% respectively.  Although impressive, two points must be highlighted.  
First, Bolivia’s entire growth (which is still less explosive than Chile’s) accounts for only 
5.1% of Chile’s 2005 GDP. Second, the gap in Peru’s GDP ratio with Chile grew from 
$1:1.2 in 1990 to 1:1.33 in 2005, a 10% increase.  Resultantly, all three countries 
experienced absolute growth, but at paces well inferior to Chile’s.78 
2. Annual Percentage (+/-) in GDP 
A second positive economic measure for Chile is annual changes in GDP (+/-).  
Measured from 1988-2005 at constant prices, Chile maintains a clear-cut advantage 
among the nations.  Between 1988 and 2005, Chile averaged a GDP growth rate of 5.82% 
annually with only a single year of absolute negative growth (-0.8 in 1999).  In contrast, 
Argentina averaged growth of less than half of Chile’s at 2.08% with greater than 50% of 
the years (8/15) negative in growth.  Peru grew the least at 1.8% and experienced the 
second highest number of negative growth years at six.  Finally, Bolivia averaged 3.55% 
growth and had the least years of negative growth with zero.  When compared side-by-
side, Chile’s growth in GDP from 1988-2005 outpaced the others by 2.2% - 4.02% while  
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simultaneously accumulating the second fewest years of contraction.79  If future regional 
growth patterns mimic the last twelve years, Chile will further distance itself from the 
pack. 
3. Competitiveness Index 
Finally, pure statistics aside, Chile continues to outpace the other nations in terms 
of competitiveness.  According to the 2004 Growth Competitiveness Index sponsored by 
the World Economic Forum, Chile ranks as the 22nd most competitive nation among 104 
states.80  The lofty rank paces Chile one behind Hong Kong SAR, but well ahead of the 
more developed countries of Belgium (25), Luxembourg (26), France (27), and Spain 
(23).  Additionally, Chile continues an upward trend of competitiveness, rising six spots 
from its previous ranking of 28th in 2003.81  Couched among first world competitors, 
Chile continues to climb. 
Opposite Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia tally some of the worst 
competitiveness scores on the planet.  According to the 2004 index, Argentina ranks 74th 
-- four spots below the corrupt Russian Federation (70) and one below Sri Lanka (73).  
Peru ranks a more respectable 67, but still comes in well behind countries such as El 
Salvador (53) and Botswana (45).  Also, Peru fell ten spots from the previous year’s rank 
of 57.  Lastly, Bolivia ranks 98th, placing it below the countries of Madagascar (96), 
Nigeria (93), Mozambique (92) and Serbia and Montenegro (89).  Like Peru, Bolivia 
slipped from the previous year, dropping thirteen spots from a 2003 rank of 85.   When 
compared to Chile, the three nations’ growth competitiveness scores rank among the third 
world while Chile’s sits amongst the first and continues to rise.82  Chile’s 
competitiveness, combined with established GDP growth patterns, signals an expanding 
economy capable of sustaining current forces and undertaking future weapon purchases.  
This means that its military can rely on a pattern of growing defense budgets unlikely to 
collapse due to economic crisis, as has occurred to neighboring militaries 
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4. Implications for the Regional Balance 
In the same pattern as military budgets and capabilities, Chile appears outmatched 
in terms of economic strength at first glance.  GDP totals of Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia 
tower over Chile’s by a ratio greater than 3.5:1 remain.  Yet, analysis of the last fifteen 
years shows the ratio and many other economic factors favoring Chile.  The inter-nation 
GDP ratio fell from a 1990 high of greater than 6:1 to the current reduced levels.   Also, 
the Chilean economy grew at an average of greater than 5.5% while Argentina and Peru 
struggled with growth rates less than half of Chile’s, sharing fourteen years of contraction 
between the two.  Additionally, Chile ranked 14th in the 2004 growth competitiveness 
index.  The same year, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia placed 76th, 67th and 98th, respectively.  
As a consequence, Chile’s superior GDP growth as an absolute and percentage, as well as 
growth competitiveness continue to outstrip its neighbors. 
E. REGIONAL RELATIONS 
The last area analyzes the improving regional relations as a result of border 
conflict resolutions.  Chile’s geography, location and history created numerous border 
conflicts over the last century.  Located on the western half of South America, Chile 
shares a massive 5,150 km border with Argentina alone.83  Starting in the northern 
deserts and ending near the Antarctic, the Chile-Argentina border is largely unpopulated 
and unpatrolled.84  Lacking clear delineation, the two states, until recently, maintained 
tense relations over nearly 25 territorial disputes.  In addition, Chile maintains disputes 
with Peru and Bolivia.  Following the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), Chile obtained 
sovereign rights to Bolivia’s former-coastal territory.  Currently landlocked and the 
poorest nation in Latin America, Bolivia refutes Chile’s claim.  Peru, also vanquished in 
the War of the Pacific, does not dispute land, but maritime access surrounding their 
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1. Argentina 
Chile and Argentina took great strides over the last quarter century to improve 
regional relations.   In 1985 Chile and Argentina resolved the Beagle Channel dispute 
which dated back to 1847.85  Claims over the islands of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva 
frustrated bilateral negotiations for years.86  In May 1977 both states attempted 
arbitration through Britain.87  Queen Elizabeth II sided in Chile’s favor and the 
Argentines rejected her ruling.  Within a year dialogue collapsed and the two nations sat 
on “the brink of open warfare.”88  Resultantly, the Vatican intervened in 1978 through 
special envoy Cardinal Antonio Samoré.89  Seven years later, in May 1985, Chile and 
Argentina signed the current treaty in Rome.90  The closure of nearly a century and a half 
wound proved a turning point in Argentine-Chilean relations. 
The two countries used the successful Beagle Channel negotiations as a 
springboard for future dialogue.  In August 1991 Presidents Aylwin and Carlos Saúl 
Menen inked an agreement which resolved twenty-two minor border disputes.91  Next, 
the neighbors targeted the second largest territorial rupture in their histories, La Laguna 
del Desierto.  Control of the area remained a tenuous subject due to a 1965 firefight in the 
desert in which a Chilean carabinero died.92  Yet, after three years of study, sixty hours 
of oral arguments, and 4,400 pages of evidence, the states peacefully resolved the issue 
through arbitration in 1994.93  Finally, in December 1998 Chile and Argentina settled 
their last territorial disagreement which stemmed from overlapping claims on the 
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continental ice shelf.94  The Antarctic treaty brought to a close thirteen years of 
negotiations, all Chile-Argentine territorial disputes and decades of friction. 
2. Peru 
In addition to Argentina, Chile enjoys improved relations with Peru.  Following 
the War of the Pacific, Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancon in 1895.95  According 
to the treaty, Chile controlled the formerly Peruvian territories of Tacna and Arica for a 
ten-year period after which a plebiscite was supposed to decide the area’s fate.96  Political 
maneuvering stalled the process until 1929, at which time President Herbert Hoover 
arbitrated a treaty.97  Chile returned Tacna to Peru while retaining Arica for itself.  
Recently, in November 1999, the neighbors reaffirmed the division by signing three 
accords formally relinquishing Peru’s claims to Arica.98  Having resolved the dispute, 
Peru and Chile continue to fortify their relations. 
The only potential territorial issue between the nations concerns the 1929 treaty’s 
definition of maritime rights.  In early 2003, politicians in Peru openly denounced the 
maritime boundaries defined by the 1929 treaty.99  The politicians claimed “Chile is 
robbing [Peru] of 35,000 m² of significant fishing waters.”100  Yet, while the delegates 
clamored, neither the Peruvian or Chilean governments responded.  Peruvian President 
Alejandro Toledo’s preferred to “downplay traditional areas of friction” in order to better 
“champion the cause of mutual support for democratization and integration in Latin 
America.”101  Across the border, Chile refused to discuss what it considers an already 
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settled issue.  Led by their respective Presidents, Peru and Chile focused on relations 
which “are better now than ever in the 125 years since the two countries went to war” 
instead of a maritime disagreement102   
3. Bolivia 
Bolivia is the only state with a recent territorial dispute with Chile.  Under 
President Carlos Mesa, Bolivia pushed for restoration of coastal access through the 
Atacama corridor in 2003.  In the past, the issue appeared closed after a failed round of 
talks in the 1970’s resulted in broken diplomatic relations.103  Yet, President Mesas and 
an accompanying “media offensive” reignited the issue” to distract Bolivians from 
domestic problems.104  Resultantly, from 2003-2004 the issue grew in international 
importance as the Bolivians rallied around the President’s cause. 
However, domestic troubles mounted in 2005, forcing Mesa’s resignation;105 calls 
for regional autonomy and natural gas rights from indigenous groups replaced the 
President’s distracting rhetoric.  As proof, Mesa’s successor, President Eduardo 
Rodriguez, did not mention the border division during his inaugural speech.  Instead, the 
new President concentrated on issues such as “natural energy resources” and “national 
solidarity.”106  With Bolivia focused on avoiding a potential civil war, the issue of coastal 
access appears moot.   
Nonetheless, even if Bolivia reactivated their claims to coastal access, the path to 
territorial restoration would be difficult.  If Chile granted sovereignty of the Atacama 
corridor to the Bolivians it would be subject to a Peruvian veto.107  The Atacama corridor 
is former territory of Peru’s and according to a complementary protocol signed on the 
same day as the 1929 treaty, “neither government without previous arrangement with the 
other may cede to any third state (in this case Bolivia) all or any part of the territory 
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which, in accordance with the treaty, remained under their respective sovereignties.”108  
Under this agreement, Peru would have to approve the transfer of the Atacama to Bolivia, 
a highly unpopular measure with the Chileans.  As a way of avoiding being put in this 
position, the Peruvians consider the matter a bilateral issue and steer clear.109  Without 
Peruvian support, the issue of coastal access remains a lame duck for the Bolivians.  
4. Implications for the Regional Balance 
According to the United States Institute for Peace, border disputes involve highly 
sensitive issues with strong connections to nationalism and national identity.110  Hence, 
while “there may be good reasons to resolve border disputes, there are also often strong 
emotion-based political barriers to doing so.”111  If disputes remain unresolved, they may 
provide a pretense for military mobilizations, intentional or unintentional, which can 
result in violence.112  Resultantly, fewer disputes correlate with greater regional stability. 
Applied to Chile, the nation greatly decreased external threats by peacefully 
negotiating the lion’s share of the border disputes.  Relations with Argentina, once 
strained by twenty plus quarrels, are now “vastly improved” due the successful 
negotiation of all territorial claims.113  Concurrently, Chile and Peru’s relations are the 
best in over a century.  The neighbor’s bilateral agreements in 1999 formally ended the 
states’ only land dispute.  The current issue between the countries concerns maritime 
access, an issue both Presidents agree is secondary to “regional defence and the 
preservation of democracy.”114  Lastly, the once boisterous Bolivians are now consumed 
with domestic problems and are unable to pursue territorial claims.  Even if the country 
avoids civil-war and resumes the campaign, Peru’s forced inclusion into the affair and 
Chile’s resistance minimize the possibility of regaining coastal access.  With these 
territorial trip wires removed, the Chileans borders are more secure than anytime in their 
recent past. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Viewed from the military budget, military capability, economic strength, and 
regional relations perspectives, the Chilean threat environment continues to diminish.  
Over the last twelve years the military budgets in Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia fluctuated 
erratically or remained stagnate while Chile’s increased by 40%.   With the additional 
funds the qualitatively superior Chilean military invested in major weapon systems 
upgrades.  The addition of Leopard 1V main battle tanks, Scorpene class submarines, and 
the General Dynamics F-16’s, ensure Chilean dominance on land, sea, and air.  
Economically, Chile’s growth in the last two decades continues to outstrip its neighbors.  
Between 1990 and 2004, Chile reduced the regional gap in GDPs from 6:1 1990 to 3.5:1 
while climbing to 14th in the world in growth competitiveness.  Lastly, the Chileans 
decreased territorial tensions over the last two decades.  Highlighted by the Beagle 
Channel resolution in 1984, Chile resolved all territorial disputes with Argentina, Bolivia 
and Peru.  Occasionally Bolivia attempts to reignite the issue, but domestic turmoil and 
Peru’s veto status preclude serious debate.  Free of territorial claims and superior in terms 
of budget, technology and economic growth, “Chile faces no credible external 
threats.”115   
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III. DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF CHILEAN DEFENSE 
SPENDING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains why Chile has maintained relatively high levels of defense 
spending on sophisticated equipment since its transition to democracy, even though threat 
levels in the region declined markedly.  It does so examining civil-military relations 
under the three governments of the center-left coalition, the Concertación, that have ruled 
Chile since the return to democracy.  During the administration of Christian Democratic 
Presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei, Jr. (1995-2000), the relatively 
high levels of defense spending were not a surprise to most observers.  The 1980 
constitution installed multiple budgetary guarantees which the autonomy of the military 
and their support from parties of the right prevented the new civilian government from 
eliminating.  However, General Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998 and the resulting 
firestorm transformed the political power structure.  The military lost its prestige, the 
right distanced itself from the armed forces, the judiciary began prosecuting human rights 
violations and the Concertación government headed by Socialist Ricardo Lagos (2000-
2006) reengaged in constitutional reform.  Despite the fluid political environment, 
military budgets remained steady and politicians made it clear the military budget 
guarantees will continue to be enshrined in the constitution.  The evidence suggests that 
Chilean civilians left military spending untouched to avoid derailing a process of 
normalization of civil-military relations, during which a renovated military leadership 
took responsibility for human rights violations and pledged their subordination to civilian 
rule.   
B. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
When the Concertación assumed power in 1990 it faced numerous institutional 
obstacles to its goal of reducing military budgets.  The outgoing authoritarian government 
of General Augusto Pinochet had erected four barriers to insulate military expenditures: 
the 1980 constitution, the Organic Law of the Armed forces, the Copper Law and a law 
setting a minimum below which defense spending could not fall.  At the same time, an 
electoral system that overrepresented the parties of the right, the presence of designated 
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senators, and the high quorums required for reform, prevented the governing coalition 
from modifying the constitutional and legal provisions protecting the defense budget  
The 1980 constitution, although slightly modified by a process of reforms in 
1989, assigned the armed forces the mission to “guarantee the institutional order of the 
republic.”116  Additionally, article 93, “instructed that the President may name the senior 
officers to the post of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Carabineros.”  Finally, 
articles 95 and 96 created a National Security Council which included the commanders of 
the armed forces and the Carabineros.117  Collectively, the measures “destined the armed 
forces to become the dominant political force of the new political system.”118  
Barriers against amendments to the constitution further protected the military’s 
role.  For example, in order for an amendment to the 1980 constitution to be passed, three 
fifths of both chambers of congress had to approve the change.119  After the initial vote, a 
sixty day waiting period followed by a simple majority to pass the amendment onto the 
President was needed.  From this step the President could reject, alter, or accept the 
amendment.  If the President opted to take either of the first two measures, a new vote 
requiring three quarters majority in both houses resulted.  Under such a structure, the only 
way to amend the constitution was to form a “super majority or to outmaneuver the 
President.”120 
Already a major obstacle to future change, a second clause in the constitution 
raised the bar.  The 1980 constitution allowed the President to appoint nine senators (The 
president directly appointed two senators, and then chose three from a list provided by 
the Supreme Court and four from a similar list from the National Security Council.).  
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With articles 43-45 of the constitution fixing the number of senators at 38, if the nine 
appointees voted as a block, they all but guaranteed a defeat for any amendment.121   
Lastly, the constitution placed nearly insurmountable burdens on those who 
wanted to amend articles specifically pertaining to the armed forces.  Chapters I 
(Principles of the Regime), VII (Constitutional Tribunal), X (Armed Forces and Forces of 
Order), and XI (National Security Council) all received special protections above and 
beyond the already robust general safeguards.  Specifically, if an amendment dealing 
with one these chapters passed the regular hurdles, it would have to wait until both 
chambers (senate and congress) were reelected.  Once that time passed, four to eight 
years depending on the interpretation, then the measure would have to be re-approved a 
second time by another majority.122  The lengthy delay and multiple votes all but 
guaranteed the status quo. 
Next, Pinochet bargained with the reformers to install The Organic Laws of the 
Armed Forces in exchange for allowing the 1989 constitutional reforms.  Equally binding 
as the constitution, La Ley Organica de la Fuerzas Armadas, increased military control 
of “internal operations, including promotions, organization, training and finances.”123  
The measures increased military autonomy while the 1989 reforms potentially eroded the 
military’s power in the long term.   
In addition to constitutional safeguards and Organic Law, Pinochet embedded 
military budget guarantees in the 1980 constitution.  Formally passed as law 13,196, or 
the better known “Copper Law,” it guaranteed a minimum level for military budgets 
based on copper exports.124  Ten percent of copper revenues from Chile’s state-owned 
 CODELCO were dedicated to defense “equipment procurement.”125  Constitutionally 
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safeguarded, the minimum spending set by the “Copper Law” rendered “civilian officials 
ineffectual in military policy decisions.”126 
Pinochet’s last measure to ensure military domination was indefinite fixed 
budgets.  Introduced one week before the Concertación assumed power, law 18,948 
guaranteed the armed forces a minimum budget “at least” equal to the military’s 1989 
budget, of $640 million.127  Irreducible, the 1989 amount included inflation indexing for 
long-term budget stability.   
In sum, the constitutional safeguards, “Copper Law,” and minimum budgets 
ensured military longevity.  The constitution’s ultra-high barriers “debilitate[d] 
democratic institutions and restrict[ed] democratic rights.”128  Since civilians would have 
little power to override the 1980 constitution, the military would enjoy autonomy and 
preeminence regardless of regime type.  Additionally, the “Copper Law” placed military 
weapons acquisitions outside of the political and social arenas.  Finally, law 18,948 gave 
autonomy to military budgets by fixing minimum spending levels.  The top cover of a 
robust constitution, the floor of minimum budgets and a guaranteed influx of arms 
ensured long-term military preeminence in Chile. 
C. BALANCE OF POWER, 1990-1998 
Parties of the center and left, which favored military subordination to civilian rule 
and reduced military spending, have made up the governing coalition since the return to 
democracy in 1990.  Christian Democratic Presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and 
Eduardo Ruiz-Tagle (1994-200) led the coalition during its first two terms in office.  
During Aylwin’s tenure, the President and the Concertación stressed the importance of 
symbolically establishing military subordination to civilian rule, even if this could not be 
accomplished in practice.  President Frei, preferring a softer approach, pursued civilian 
control of the military through accommodation and dialogue.  
In reducing military budgets, Presidents Aylwin and Frei’s efforts were blocked 
by the political balance of power in the legislature where designated senators and parties 
of the right combined to posses veto power over any government initiative.  The parties 
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of the right, Renovación Nacional (RN) and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), 
felt an “independent security power”129 such as the military served as a check on the 
unproven democracy.  Similarly, the military – with General Pinochet at its head until 
March of 1998 – sought autonomy and a position from which they were “capable of 
influencing politics.”130  Wary of the civilian government, the military saw themselves as 
protectors of stability. Also, the armed forces desired insulation against prosecution for 
past human rights abuses. The ideological beliefs as guarantors of stability, their self-
interest in autonomy, and future protection from prosecution, cemented the opposition 
into a cohesive block. 
With Chile ideologically split, the congressional elections of 1989 and 1997 
impeded constitutional reform.  During the 1989 elections, the Concertación won 66 of 
120 seats in the lower house and 20 of 38 elected seats in the Senate.  In 1997, the 
coalition won 70 and 20, respectively.  Although the Concertación won both elections, 
the 9 appointed senators tipped the senate in favor of the conservative parties.  Political 
gridlock resulted. 
Outgunned in the legislature, Presidents Aylwin and Frei undertook efforts to 
reduce defense spending through other means as part of their broader efforts to reform 
civil-military relations and tend to the socioeconomic needs of their constituents.  The 
following section demonstrates, although they met with some success in keeping defense 
spending in check, spending levels stayed at a much higher level than one would have 
predicted given reduced threat levels in the region and the preferences of the governing 
coalition. 
1. Aylwin Administration, Civil-Military Relations and the Defense 
Budget (1990-1994) 
Beginning with Patricio Aylwin’s inauguration in March of 1990, the President 
“attempted to address the issue of civilian supremacy over the military.”131  In public,  
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President Aylwin surprised observers by standing up to Pinochet.  If displeased with the 
Army commander’s behavior, President Aylwin often summoned Pinochet for one-on-
one meetings.132   
Symbolically significant, the President’s actions provided few changes.  
Presidents Aylwin and Frei learned beyond the rhetoric and symbols they “did not have 
enough legal tools to reduce the military’s autonomy.”133  Understanding these 
shortcomings, the armed forces increased frustrations by exercising their independence.  
Under the authority of the Organic Law, the military created “their own programs, 
changed their logistical structure and bought new weapons with minimal civilian 
influence.”134  Twice during President Aylwin’s tenure, the military staged independent 
troop movements without civil notification (El Boinazo and El Ejercicio de Enlace).  The 
government, which opposed the movements, either met the infractions with superficial 
meetings or went to the National Security Council.  A hold over from the Pinochet-era, 
the NSC only “blurred the military’s subordinated position in relation to the 
President.”135  Able to act independently, frustrate the reform process, and exercise 
authority under the Organic Law, the military evaded civilian control. 
The Aylwin government, frustrated by its congressional weakness and the 
military's autonomy, used the military's budget minimum (law 18,948) to curb military 
expenditures.  Between 1990 and 1994, President Aylwin provided the military the 
minimum budgets as specified in the 1989 guarantees, adjusted for inflation.  As the 
Chilean economy grew and inflation remained low, the military's proportion of 
government expenditures shrank and total defense expenditures stagnated.  Military 
outlays as a percent of the national budget dropped from 15.60% in 1989 to 10.25% by 
1994.  Defense budgets hovered at $1 billion ($US billions, 1996) throughout the period. 
What General Pinochet designed as a guarantee of military autonomy transformed into a 
tool for civilian control of defense budgets.136 
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2. The Frei Administration, Civil-Military Relations and the Defense 
Budget (1994-1998) 
Not wanting to continue the political-military gamesmanship of his predecessor, 
President Frei sought a different approach.  Sharing the view of many leaders “that the 
political context inhibited, at least in the short run, any constitutional reform,”137  
President Frei shifted the “government’s global strategy [to] emphasize issues such as the 
country’s modernization.”138  Education, health care, infrastructure, and international 
relations overtook the military debate.  Concurrently, Chile’s growth reached annual 
levels of 6% or greater.139  In order to sustain such a rate, the government had to attract 
foreign investors.  Resultantly, selling the image of domestic tranquility displaced the 
potentially volatile political reform process.140   
In order to present a pacific domestic image, President Frei tried to promote 
dialogue between Chile's government and military.  The President's first step was to 
discontinue President Aylwin's policy of minimum defense expenditures.  Second, 
President Frei appointed Edmundo Pérez-Yoma as defense minister.  Pérez-Yoma proved 
much less combative in dealing with the military, developing a personal relationship with 
General Pinochet and including ex-military members amongst his "iron circle" of 
advisors.141  Next, President Frei attempted to "break the prejudices"142 against the 
military by cooperating with the army's initiative to increase the number of civilians 
awarded defense degrees.  The number of civilians receiving master's degrees at the 
army's War College jumped from the historic level of 50% to 80% by 1998.143  Lastly, 
the Ministry of Defense published the first ever “Defense White Book” in 1997.144  The 
publication "neutralized military concerns over whether or not civilians would every 
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seriously or systematically address the country's defense."145  Collectively, the measures 
aimed at building trust through civil-military dialogue. 
Despite President Frei's overtures towards the military, the armed forces 
continued to exercise their autonomy.  In May 1995, the Supreme Court sentenced 
Manuel Contreras, former Chief of the National Intelligence Service, and Colonel 
Espinoza, his second in command, to seven and six years in prison, respectively.146  The 
armed forces responded to Contreras' sentence by transferring him to a naval hospital for 
"humanitarian reasons."147  General Pinochet, however, justified the action as a response 
to Contreras' "unjust" verdict.  Meanwhile, in dealing with Colonel Espinoza, who 
entered regular prison without incident, the army issued a warning to the government.  
On 22 July, three hundred military officers paid a visit to the Colonel as part of a 
"peaceful" demonstration against the government.  Later titled El Peucazo, the movement 
and General Contreras' sudden transfer underscored the military's suspicion and disdain 
for civilian government.  
With civil-military overtures proving fruitless and the military continuing to 
exercise their autonomy, defense expenditures remained steady throughout the period.  
Between 1994 and 1998, defense expenditures as a percent of the national budget 
dropped from 10.25 to 9%.  However, total expenditures in $US dollars and Chilean 
pesos (pCH) increased.  In terms of U.S. dollars, outlays swelled by 13% from $US 1.08 
billion to 1.22 billion.  In Chilean pesos, budgets jumped by 12% from 570 million to 640 
million pesos.  The copper law, spending minimums and Organic Laws remained without 
modifications. 
D. PINOCHET'S ARREST AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Civil-military relations remained unchanged in Chile until 16 October 1998.  On 
that fateful morning General Pinochet lay in a hospital bed recovering from back surgery 
when British authorities seized the General on behalf of Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón.   
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Following Judge Garzón’s orders, the British courts charged the general with murder, 
conspiracy to murder, hostage taking, torture, and kidnapping.148  Press agencies 
worldwide broadcast the shocking news.   
General Pinochet's arrest unleashed an unexpected chain of events in Chile that 
weakened the political power of the military and seemed to provide the preconditions for 
the center-left governing coalition to reduce military prerogatives, including the defense 
budget.  The right, with its first opportunity in decades to win presidential election, 
deserted Pinochet in the name of electoral expediency.  The judiciary, surprisingly moved 
by international developments, began its own campaign of trials against Pinochet and 
other members of the armed forces accused of human rights violations.  The military 
itself, affected by both of these processes, deepened a process of subordination to civilian 
rule that had begun when General Pinochet stepped down in 1998 as head of the Armed 
Forces.  Within this context, the administration of President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 
saw the opportunity to normalize civil-military relations by reducing the institution's 
political prerogatives but continuing to defend its institutional prerogatives, including a 
defense budget suitable for force modernization.  This section discusses the impact of 
Pinochet's arrest on three key actors – the right, the judiciary and the military.  The 
following section describes and explains the somewhat surprising decision of the 
government of the Socialist President Lagos to respond to the fluid political environment 
by increasing defense spending levels.  
1. The Right 
Ardent supporters of Pinochet, the General's arrest forced the right to decide 
between backing the General or changing tack.  The 1999 elections, and the right's 
chance of winning them, pushed the right away from Pinochet.  Heading into the 
elections, polls indicated Joaquin Lavín, the right's presidential candidate, had a 
legitimate shot at winning.  Already popular among moderates, the Concertación's 
nomination of socialist candidate instead of a Christian Democrat boosted Lavín's appeal 
with centrists.  Additionally, the Concertación and the right understood that whoever won  
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the elections would have to immediately deal with the Pinochet issue.  Not wanting to 
lose support of the center and recognizing the General's decline, Lavín, "consciously 
distanced himself from Pinochet." 149 
Mr. Lavín and the right's strategy of disassociation nearly worked.  In the first 
round of elections Mr. Lavín garnered 47.51 percent of the vote to Ricardo Lagos' 47.95 
percent.  In the ensuing runoff election Joaquin Lavín lost by a scant 2.4 percent, a result 
that confirmed the wisdom of the right's strategy to distance itself from Pinochet.150  
Impressed by Lavin's showing, the parties of the rightist coalition decided “to accept the 
inevitability of a solution to the human rights issues” and hedge towards the political 
center in the future.151   
2. Judiciary 
Next, Pinochet's trial transformed the judiciary from a tertiary actor to a key 
player in state policy.  The General's prosecution “accelerated several dynamics that were 
slowly progressing until then,”152 resulting in an “explosion of trials in Chile which until 
then had been developed timidly by the Judiciary."153 
The judiciary channeled their resurgence into a two pronged attack on General 
Pinochet and his old commanders.  Until 1998, the 1978 amnesty decree successfully 
shielded military leaders from prosecution in at least 80% of cases involving the 2,603 
officially recorded “disappearances.”154  In 1998, the courts reinterpreted the amnesty 
law in that “cases of disappearance, as long as there was no evidence of death, should be 
viewed as ongoing cases of kidnapping.”155  Armed with this new interpretation, the 
judiciary stepped up prosecutions of junta era commanders.   
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By January 2002 the courts charged over one hundred retired officers for their 
involvement in known deaths and disappearances.  In January of 2004, the Santiago 
Appeals Court upheld the conviction of General Manuel Contreras, the notorious DINA 
boss.  By mid-2004, the number of former military personnel charged or convicted 
reached 311, of which twenty-one were generals.156 
With the myth of immunity surrounding the military shattered, prosecuting 
Pinochet became the judiciary's top priority.  When Pinochet returned to Chile on 3 
March 2000, he was stripped of his senatorial immunity by domestic courts within a 
month.  After the appellate court upheld the verdict, the Chilean Supreme Court finalized 
the action on 8 August 2004.157  By year's end, the once proud general became an 
increasingly irrelevant figure in Chilean politics. 
3. The Military 
Finally, the Pinochet ordeal changed the composition of the military actors.  For 
the older officers, judicial pressures and forced retirements thinned their ranks.  By the 
end of 1998, the number of junta era generals shrunk from a 1984 high of fifty-one to 
forty-two.158  In the same year, twelve senior officers retired, the largest outpouring since 
1988.159  For the younger officers, the trials sped up their transition to top leadership 
positions.  Chile’s “Ley Canessa,” which limits military service to a maximum of thirty-
seven years after an officer’s commission unless an extension is granted by the chief 
executive, began to affect senior officers at the time of the trial.160  Due to rekindled 
reform efforts, President Frei declined the extensions to senior leadership involved 
directly or indirectly in the coup.161  Younger officers replaced the forced retirees.  Thus, 
as the Pinochet case dragged on, the leadership of the military shifted. 
The shift in the overall composition of the office corps facilitated the task of 
installing General Izurieta, who had been appointed to replace Pinochet as head of the 
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Armed Force in mid 1998.  Backed by President Frei, General Izurieta had the least 
seniority of the five generals nominated for the command.  Prior to his appointment, 
General Izurieta's career had been "almost entirely professional, so Pinochet had never 
acted as his mentor."162  Also, Izurieta spent many years working as an attaché in the 
United States.  The General's professionalism within the civilian controlled billet earned 
the praise of former Chilean ambassador John Biehl and Defense Minister Pérez. 
The new leadership (led by General Izurieta), coupled with “a growing sense of 
isolation,” initiated a rethink in military policy.163  Senior officers, under judicial scrutiny 
and with investigations resulting in criminal charges or retirement, had their political 
power curtailed.  The younger officers pursued normalized relations with the populace 
and civilians in power.  The unthinkable -- cooperation with human rights investigations -
- became a central goal.  Army General Carlos Salgado believed increased openness 
would contribute to “harmony and peace for the national soul.”164  Chief of the Navy, 
Admiral Vergara, stated “We want to support all Chileans...we want to be a modern force 
at the service of the country.”165  Tarnished by their past, the military hoped to forge a 
positive role in Chile’s future. 
Concurrently, the military sought “a way out of isolation and…a move that would 
begin to solve problems that kept them from concentrating on [their] professional 
mission.”166  In 1999, the Ministry of Defense and the military agreed to a "Mesa de 
Dialogo" on human rights issues which called for “truth, justice, reparation, and pardon 
without specific conditions or timetables.”167  Within this framework, the armed forces, 
as an institution, admitted and apologized for abuses previously blamed on individuals.  
Additionally, the military “signed a text in which they express[ed] a changed, democratic, 
vision of the democratic breakdown, and on the human rights they had previously 
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institutionally violated, then justified, and neglected.”168  Disclosure of crimes, 
prosecution of officers, and a transition to civilian subordination all occurred “without a 
single episode of resistance.”169  This contrasted noticeably with the army's very public 
expression of its "fundamental disagreement" with the national report on human rights 
(the Rettig Report) in 1991 and its refusal to seek pardon for the democratic breakdown 
and subsequent violations of human rights.170 
E. NORMALIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Witness to much of the upheaval following Pinochet's arrest, the Lagos regime 
pursued a conciliatory strategy with the armed forces.  Instead of further intruding in 
military affairs (as the judiciary was already prosecuting retired officers), the executive 
sought to build on the Frei administration's initiatives to normalize relations.  In 2002, 
President Lagos appointed Michelle Bachelet as minister of Defense.  The daughter of an 
air force general (Alberto Bachelet) who died from torture after his 1974 arrest, Bachelet 
made only positive comments about the military during her tenure, promoting military 
acceptance.  Also, the Lagos regime appointed Juan Emilio Cheyre Espinosa as the new 
head of the army.  Upon assuming command, General Espinosa visited every regiment 
and division in the country, accepting inputs towards developing a new "concept of 
demand."171 
In response to President Lagos' actions, the armed forces have continued to 
reaffirm their commitment to human rights and civil subordination.  On 5 November 
2004, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army, stated, 
“The Army of Chile made the difficult, but irreversible decision to assume responsibility 
as an institution for all of the reprehensible and morally unacceptable actions of the 
past."172  On 10 November, Admiral Miguel Vergara, Commander in Chief of the Navy, 
declared “For the 25,000 people I am in command of now I put my hands to the fire that 
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none of them are involved in violations of human rights.”173  Next, on 12 November 
2004, Arturo Herrera, head of the civil police admitted, “We were not beyond the actions 
that caused damage, pain and suffering for many people.”174  Across the majority of 
services, the commanders expressed their dedication to human rights. 
Amidst the shifts in civil-military relations between 1998 and the present, Chile's 
military budgets increased.  Following Pinochet’s 1998 arrest, the defense budget as 
percentage of GDP increased for four straight years from 1.59% to 1.79%.  Expressed as 
a percentile, military outlays jumped nearly 9%.  In terms of Chilean pesos, the budget 
grew by 95 million pesos or 13% during the same period.175  Only when calculating the 
budget in U.S. dollars, did outlays fall.  Despites this, the armed forces purchased Black 
Hawk Helicopters, P-3 Orion’s, F-16 multi-role fighters and four advanced frigates 
during this period.  These acquisitions and the past budgets confirm, despite the fluid 
political environment, that Chilean defense expenditures remain a solid fixture. 
1. Constitutional Reforms 
A process of constitutional reforms also played a central part in President Lagos' 
plan for normalizing civil-military relations in Chile.  As the Presidential candidate for 
the Concertación in December 1999 elections that took place amidst the publicity 
surrounding Pinochet's arrest and pending trial, Socialist Ricardo Lagos campaigned on a 
platform of "a constitution that passes the test of full democracy."176  Once in office, 
President Lagos and congressional supporters refined their goals to including removing 
the "authoritarian enclaves" such as designated senators and life seats in Congress for 
former president and restoring the president's right to fire military commanders.177  
Significantly, the reforms did not include any changes in the legal or constitutional 
guarantees of defense spending. 
In October 2004 José Miguel Insulza, Chile’s interior minister, and Hernán 
Larrain, the Senate President and member of the opposition UDI, brokered a deal for 
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constitutional reform.  Shortly thereafter, the Senate voted unanimously to abolish 
appointed senators (when their terms expire in 2006), to reinstate the President’s right to 
fire military commanders, and to eliminate life-long senate seats for former Presidents.  
After a year of further negotiations, the two parties agreed to a full session of Congress 
on 16 August 2005 to finalize the accord in the lower house.  Passed with little 
opposition, the law will be enacted by the end of 2005.178 
Parties across the political spectrum declared the reforms “a historic moment in 
the consolidation of democracy in Chile.”179  President Lagos stated, “We can now say 
that the transition in Chile has concluded.”180  Andrés Zaldívar, a senator from the PDC, 
affirmed “The reforms were the ultimate missing element to conclude the transition.”181  
Hernán Larraín, a UDI senator, highlighted “With this accord democracy has been 
perfected and deepened, giving stability to the country.”182  President Lagos declared 
“victory for Chile.”183  Contented with the military’s subordination and mission, reducing 
expenditures no longer appears a civilian priority. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Prior to General Pinochet’s arrest, Chile’s high military budgets are easily 
explainable.  The "Copper Law," budget minimums, Organic Laws of the Armed Forces 
and the 1980 constitution guaranteed a position of preeminence for the military.  The 
UDI and RN, allied with the military, combined their senate seats with the appointed 
members to frustrate constitutional reform efforts.  Additionally, the military evaded 
human rights prosecutions, staged independent troop movements, and retained autonomy.  
In response, military budgets remained stable, dropping as a percentage of the national 
budget, but increasing in total value in terms of $US dollars and Chilean pesos. 
Analyzing the 1998-present period the explanation for high budgets becomes 
more difficult.  Pinochet’s arrest in 1998 besmirched the military name.  Resultantly, the 
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judiciary increased prosecution of the General and his subordinates and the right 
distanced themselves from the armed forces.  The Concertación, which up to 1998 
avoided constitutional reform, reinitiated the venture, this time enlisting the right.  Able 
to overcome the authoritarian hurdles in the constitution jointly, the coalitions eradicated 
what they felt to be all “authoritarian enclaves” in the document but removal of defense 
budget guarantees was noticeably absent.  Meanwhile, retirement and prosecution of 
senior officers and the rise of younger officers transformed military leadership.  The 
armed forces responded by cooperating in human rights investigations.  The government 
reciprocated by not removing budget guarantees, furthering the "normalization" of civil-
military relations.  But is this a stable equilibrium?  Will civilians reduce defense 
spending once the military is clearly subordinated?  The next chapter shows spending 
guarantees will remain.  Civilian elites justify spending levels and the cultivation of a 
modernized military as essential to the military’s new mission -- peacekeeping.  This 
mission is designed to ensure continued military subordination while satisfying civilian 
foreign policy goals. 
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IV. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY BENEFITS FROM 
PEACEKEEPING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter argues that peacekeeping will remain an important mission for the 
Chilean military in the foreseeable future because it serves the interest of both the 
military and civilian elites.  Militarily, peacekeeping increases and justifies budgets, and 
boosts personal pay and morale.  For the government, peacekeeping drives civil-military 
dialogue, provides a conventional and subordinate role for the armed forces, and 
enhances Chile’s international presence.  Benefiting each side individually, peacekeeping 
dually promotes stability and predictability in civil-military relations.  As such, Chile’s 
commitment to peacekeeping will endure.  In order to prove this, the first section of the 
chapter addresses the theoretical advantages of peacekeeping as a mission for stable 
democracy and the second section examines these arguments in light of evidence from 
Chile. 
B. THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF PEACEKEEPING 
Before analyzing Chile’s peacekeeping policies, it is important to understand the 
theoretical impact of the mission on peacekeeping force providers.  Over the last two 
decades global peacekeeping operations increased dramatically.  From the inception of 
PKOs in 1948 to 1990, the number of UN sponsored missions totaled eighteen.184  From 
1990-2004 the total jumped to fifty-nine, an increase of over two hundred percent.185  
Troop participation rose as well.  In 1988, 10,000 ground personnel participated in PKOs.  
By 1993, 78,000 troops were deployed and in October 2004, 63,000.186  The increase in 
personnel and total missions cement PKOs as a fundamental UN mission. 
This increase in PKOs and demand for peacekeepers after 1990 creates a new 
opportunity for military and civilian governments alike.  Theoretically, governments can 
use PKOs in order to increase international exposure as well to foment civil-military 
reform.  Conversely, the armed forces, in an era of shrinking traditional threats, recognize 
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peacekeeping as a stable mission with associated budgets and incentives.  With civilian 
and military authorities mutually benefiting from PKOs, the missions will increase in 
importance as long as traditional threats do not upset the advantageous arrangement.    
1. Military Incentives 
Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) offer a range of benefits for military forces, 
from increased training to international prestige. Of these advantages, one of the most 
important for developing countries is justification for stable budgets.  Following the end 
of the Cold War, nearly every country, including the United States, searched for a new 
role for their militaries.  Installations closed down and budgets dwindled as civil scrutiny 
and competition for government resources increased.  Feeling this pressure, many 
commanders warmed up to peacekeeping as a way to create an “ongoing” mission for the 
military.187  Not surprisingly, resistance to peacekeeping diminished and the number 
PKOs swelled in the 1990s.  Many militaries rely on PKOs to validate budgets personal 
pay and pensions. 
PKOs are especially attractive due to their low cost to the deploying country.  In 
2004, the United Nations reimbursed contributing countries US$1000/month for each 
uniformed member deployed.188  Specialists received an additional 25% stipend.189  
Officers collected a per-diem ranging from $85-120.190  In comparison to many 
countries, the extra pay dwarfs or considerably increases base salaries.  The result is a 
reduction in domestic expenditures and an incentive for military participation. 
A second factor that drives down cost is logistical support.  First, units deployed 
“enjoy the advantage of being well-funded with regard to fuel and spares.”191  Supplies 
provided by the UN often grease the wheels of poorly supplied armed forces.  An 
Argentine commander serving in Cyprus stated, “We are used to doing a lot with very 
little at home, the UN provides adequate resources for the accomplishment of the 
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mission.”192  Second, the UN provides the bulk of mission planning.  UN staffers draw 
up the participating force’s goals, number of minimum operations, sorties, manhours for 
observation duty, etc.193  The centralized logistical planning reduces workload while 
increasing interoperability.  Adding to UN reimbursements, the supplies and logistic 
support further diminish home state costs. 
Third, militaries receive material benefits such as hardware and training for 
participation in PKOs.  The training enforces UN mandates and the rewards state 
contributions.  As examples, Argentina, despite opposition from the British, received 
radar upgrades for their A4M Skyhawks for their peacekeeping endeavors in the 
1990’s.194  Additionally, Uruguay and Argentina received C-130s for prior UN 
commitments.195  Next, Yugoslavian pilots received NATO training and doctrine in order 
to help them enforce Iraq’s “no fly-zone.”196  The combined hardware and training 
provide a strong incentive for military participation.   
Fourth, the military gains valuable combat and simulated-combat experience by 
participating in PKOs.  The majority of PKOs are conducted in hostile field conditions 
that “approximate” actual combat.197  The parallels between domestic exercise and PKO 
reality increase military readiness.  As proof, interviews with four hundred Argentine 
officers who served in peacekeeping missions revealed 94% felt “peacekeeping serves a 
valuable role.”198  Additionally, state inquiries into Canada’s deployment of forces to 
Somalia reported “peacekeeping skills enhance the security and combat capacity of 
Canadian troops.”199  Military forces, enjoying UN supplies, employ tactics learned in 
training, increasing combat readiness. 
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In addition to training, pay, and concessions, PKOs boost morale.  PKOs provide 
the armed forces a “valid military mission on a highly visible stage.” 200 As such, PKOs 
help “re-legitimize officers…who had lost the due deference of citizens.”201  The 
improved relations help form “a better partnership with civilian authorities and 
society.”202  Integrated within the state and government, armed forces become “a 
valuable player in the government’s foreign policy.”203  Morale increases as military’s 
receive respect in arenas where they “previously found disdain.”204   
Lastly, PKOs provide a forum for interaction amongst armed forces.  The 
international flavor of PKOs exposes units to alternate languages, histories, politics and 
economics.  This contact with other armed forces increases tolerance as well as 
professionalization of units.205  Additionally, interaction furthers integration, cooperation 
and most importantly interoperability between nations.206  Immersed in a multi-cultural 
environment, the military’s becomes more tolerant while shedding the veil of secrecy 
under which many function. 
In short, PKOs provide a gamut of advantages for armed forces.  PKOs provide a 
respected mission in the post Cold War era.  With many nations facing budgets cuts and 
trying to replace aging equipment, UN reimbursement and logistical support increase 
personnel pay while diminishing the “home state burden.”207  Additionally, militaries 
receive concessions such as spare aircraft or specialized training.  Once deployed, 
participants experience combat-like environments which increase military readiness.  
Morale increases as the “highly visible” mission reinserts the military in civil society.   
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Lastly, cross-training increase soldiers’ professionalization and interoperability.  For 
armed forces with a diminished importance, these benefits synergistically increase the 
militaries’ strategic value. 
2. Civilian Leadership Incentives 
PKOs offer civilians numerous benefits as well.  In Latin America one of the 
greatest challenges remains the “incorporation and accommodation of the armed forces 
within the democratic equation.”208  According to Claudio Fuentes, civil-military 
interactions fall under three categories: division of spheres, non-cooperation and 
engagement.209  If a government pursues division of spheres, both sides function under 
the agreement “we shall not meddle in your affairs if you do not meddle in ours.”210  
Under non-cooperation, the government excludes the military from policy making 
decisions.  Lastly, engagement attempts to include the military in government policies.  
Of the three strategies, Mr. Fuentes finds, engagement is “the best way to achieve 
subordination.”211 
Fortunately, PKOs promote civil-military engagement in three ways.  First, PKOs 
provide the armed forces a role and a mission.  Instead of “maintaining an ill-equipped, 
underpaid, and unused military establishment,”212 PKOs provide training, pay, and a 
sense of purpose.  Increased budgets, foreign policy inputs as well as a mission on a 
global stage, engages military capacities.  Once a stagnant force, militaries are 
reinvigorated with a credible mission. 
Second, PKOs enhance civil-military dialogue.  In the words of Rut Diamint, 
“Neither military goal statements nor the allocation of resources and equipment are 
enough to guarantee a proper role for the military professional without the military’s 
recognition and institutionalization of its accountability to civilian authorities.”213  The 
high level of civil-military interaction in PKOs institutionalizes accountability.  Defense 
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ministries identify, coordinate and direct PKOs.  In return, militaries receive budgets and 
carry out “manpower-intensive endeavors.”214  The exchange reaffirms the military 
mission while codifying civilian authority.  The Argentine Defense Minister in 1995 
stated, “[PKOs] not only gives members of the armed forces a deep feeling of 
professional pride, but also an international outlook which is very much helping to 
consolidate the military as a pillar of the constitutional system.”215  The end result is 
increased military engagement and dialogue, both of which promote subordination.  
Lastly, PKOs increase transparency and oversight in military affairs.  During 
PKOs, military personnel work alongside NGOs, international observers, and health 
providers.216  Faced with international organizations, military are careful and avoid 
violating their sensibilities.  Additionally, oversight agencies monitor military actions.  
Data is collected on troop movements, missions, training, etc. then disseminated at which 
point it becomes public record.217  Combined, the international oversight and constraints 
on behavior increase transparency.  When added to the civil-military dialogue and the 
sense of mission, the transparency cements armed forces into the “democratic equation.” 
In addition to integrating the military, PKOs serve as a catalyst for greater 
international exposure.218  Small to medium sized states may use the international draw 
of peacekeeping to compliment their foreign policy objectives.  International press casts 
governments in a positive light boosting their regional and global credibility.  Argentina’s 
former president, Carlos Menem, stated “the main idea [participating in peacekeeping 
operations], from the political point of view, is to raise the profile, let others know about 
Argentina.”219  The President’s formula worked as Argentina became the United State’s 
darling throughout the 1990’s.220  Able to harness attention from PKO participation, 
states increase international political capital.  
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In summary, civilian authorities greatly benefit from peacekeeping.  Facing the 
challenge of civil-military reform, democracies are advised to pursue the engagement 
strategy.  PKOs complement engagement as they provide a respected mission that 
requires sustained budgets and equipment upgrades.  While the benefits do not guarantee 
military subordination, the high level of civilian management and control of PKOs 
stimulates civil-military dialogue.  Transparency and international oversight increases 
trust as both sides’ actions are public record.  Finally, the international exposure of 
peacekeeping casts small-to-medium nations on an international stage.  Collectively, the 
advantages promote state participation in PKOs, civilian supremacy and a mutually 
beneficial civil-military arrangement. 
C. THE ROLE OF PKOS IN CHILEAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Chile’s current civil-military arrangement supports the arguments set forth by 
proponents of the benefits of peacekeeping.  Chile’s military desires institutional 
justification.  Falling threat levels no longer validate military budgets.  Conversely, 
civilians crave military subordination as well as a global diplomatic presence.  With the 
democratic transition “completed,” the government remains wary of the constitutionally 
funded yet idle Chilean military.  As a result, both sides use peacekeeping to achieve 
their separate goals.  The armed forces enjoy high budgets, morale, and purpose while the 
civilians subordinate the military and project their presence on regional and global level.  
The mutually beneficial arrangement reinforces Chile’s peacekeeping commitment.   
Chile’s increase in PKOs reflects the two sides’ advantageous agreement.  In 
1998, the Minister of defense assigned a permanent liaison officer to the United Nations.  
Next, in February 2000, the army deployed a flight of helicopters, comprising three 
aircraft and 41 soldiers, to assist in the United Nation’s East Timor mission (UNTAET).  
One Chilean designee served as a plans officer in headquarters for UNTAET.  In the 
same year, the army sent an officer to Kosovo to serve as a liaison between NATO and 
UN forces.  In 2001 a naval officer served as instructor to the Argentina Center of 
Training for Peace Operations (CAECOPAZ).  Additionally, a second officer integrated 
himself into the Argentine military peacekeeping battalion deployed to Cyprus.221  
Lastly, in 2004 the military cemented its commitment to peacekeeping by participating in 
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the largest peacekeeping deployment in state history.  In February 2004, Chile 
contributed a battalion of 370 Army Infantry and Special Forces to the provisional force 
in Haiti.  Already astounding, after three months of operations and a switch to U.N. 
command, Chile bolstered the force to over 600 personnel comprised of personnel from 
all three military services as well as the Carabineros.222  To boot, former foreign relations 
minister, Juan Gabriel Valdés, took over as the Chief UN officer in Haiti.  As the UN’s 
highest ranking representative, Valdés reaffirmed Chile’s dedication to Haiti “for the long 
haul,” despite a U.N. prediction of a twenty plus year operation.223  With both civilians 
and the armed forces reaping rewards, peacekeeping continues to expand. 
1. Military Incentives 
Deeper analysis of the benefits of the armed forces supports the gainful 
arrangement.  First, the diminished threat environment and the fall of Pinochet reduced 
the armed forces strategic importance.  The once proud military became an idle body 
associated with human rights abuses and authoritarianism domestically and 
internationally.  Cognizant of the situation and with newer leadership at the helm, 
commanders became more open to the idea of peacekeeping.  Resultantly, Chile agreed 
to support UN PKOs under the stipulation “operations must contribute to the 
improvement of participating Chilean institutions.”224  Functioning under this agreement, 
in 2005 all services participate in PKOs.  As proof, amongst the 600 plus troops in Haiti, 
350 are soldiers and marines, 38 are Carabineros, 85 are engineer, and the rest are Air 
Force personnel maintaining a squadron of UH-1H “Huey’s.”225  Additionally, the 
Carabineros are expanding their role as General Alberto Cienfuegos agreed to provide 
training and technical assistance to the Haitian national police.226  Documented in Chile’s 
UN charter and able to reach across all services, PKOs justify the military institution. 
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Next, PKO increase the Chilean military’s budget.  In 2004, the year the military 
fully committed to PKOs, the budget was the highest in the last four years and a second 
year of increase.  As a result, Chile’s military’s expenditures reached record levels.  
Reinforcing the link between budget and peacekeeping, Defense Minister Bachelet stated, 
“The process of modernization of the Air Force is specifically oriented toward 
participation in these [peacekeeping] operations.”227   With budgets and PKOs on the 
rise, and the government justifying expenditures in terms of peacekeeping capabilities, 
military coffers will continue to swell. 
In addition to high military budgets, the Chilean military is also enjoying 
increased personnel salaries.  According to El Mercurio, the UN pays each Chilean 
soldiers, engineers, pilots etc. deployed in Haiti US$1,028/month.228  Compared to a 
Chilean cabo segundo’s (American equivalent of a private) monthly income of $320.00, 
the added cash increases his/her pay over 300%.229  The budgetary and personal pay 
incentives strengthen military motivations for participation as well as morale. 
Furthermore, the Chilean armed forces benefit from the low cost of missions due 
to UN reimbursement.  Chile’s two years of operations supporting MINUSTAH cost the 
state a gross total of US$88 million.230  Of that total, the UN will reimburse $50 million.  
Additionally, the increased pay to uniformed personnel exceeds $22 million.  Subtracting 
the reimbursement and personnel pay incentives, Chile’s net cost for MINUSTAH is a 
paltry $15 million.231  The minimal price tag and institutional advantages convince 
personnel such as Seaman Mauricio Diaz that “Chile has a commitment before the United 
Nations and the world to achieve peace.”232 
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Yet, the Chilean armed forces expect training and concessions in addition to 
reimbursements.  According to Chile’s UN charter regarding PKOs, operations “must 
give results in expertise, personnel training, procurement and replacement of material 
equipment, etc.”233  Living up to the charter, Chile received extra Bell UH-1H “Huey’s” 
and spare parts for their role in Kuwait.234  Additionally, Chileans deployed to Haiti are 
receiving training in order to conduct patrols, arm control checkpoints, and perform 
medical reaction, rubble excavation, and orphanage construction.235  Academically, units 
receive courses in mechanics, electrical engineering, and first response.236  Commenting 
on these conditions, Commander Rodrigo Carrasco, head of the Chilean Battalion in 
Cabo Haitiano stated “peace mission are significant because they allow us to put into 
practice and reality that which we have learned in life.”237  Combined with six-month 
rotations and logistical support, training and concessions received by the Chilean military 
impact a high volume of personnel. 
Furthermore, PKOs boost the morale of Chilean armed forces.  General 
Cienfuegos classified PKOs as a “great motivation.”238  Commander Rodrigo Carrasco, 
head of the Army Battalion in Cabo Haitiano, brimmed “Although after six months of 
deployment I want to return, it is worth it…One feels the affection of the children… It 
puts a lump in your throat and pulls on your heart.”239  Army and Air Force pilots 
received the MINUSTAH medal from Brazilian General Augusto Heleno Ribero, the 
Haitian deployment commander.  Colonel Federico Klock, commander of the helicopter 
group stated “Flying for peace, this is the statement that animates and motivates us daily 
as we do it for the security of others, contributing to a consolidated human end and for 
hope in the future of the nation.”240  Even the most junior soldiers such as Seaman 
                                                 
233  “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Chile.” 
234  Palá, 138. 
235  Reymond. 
236  Ibid. 
237  Ibid. 
238  “Carabineros Entrenará a Policia Haitiana.” 
239  Reymond. 
240  “Personal Chileno de Grupo de Helicópteros Conjunto Fue Condecorado en Haití por su Servicio 
a la Paz,” Minister of Defense of Chile, available at http://www.defensa.cl/paginas/public/noticias/2004/ 
2911condecoracion.htm; Internet; accessed 22 August 2005. 
51
Mauricio Diaz expressed pride in PKOs.  The young sailor feels “Chile has a 
commitment before the United Nations and the world to achieve peace.”241   From 
General (Carabineros) to Colonel (Army/Air Force) to Seaman (Navy), Chileans across 
all the services and all ranks are proud of their participation in PKOs. 
Lastly, the Chileans armed forces are able to interact with other units.  When 
Chile first deployed to Haiti as part of the 3,600 troop response they were the only 
country from Latin America.  The 300 plus member force deployed and worked 
alongside U.S., Canadian, and French militaries.  Currently the 600 plus force is 
embedded amongst 6,299 troops, 1,437 civilian police, 425 international civilian 
personnel, 800 local civilian staff and 139 UN volunteers.242  Integrating themselves 
amongst troops from regional partners Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil as well as far-off 
allies like the Philippines, Chileans are immersed in foreign cultures.  Seaman First Class 
Samy Hawa enjoys the opportunity.  The younger sailor states, “PKOs provide us 
experience with real international conflicts and situations…while providing an exchange 
of experiences and increasing the sense of community amongst soldiers and units.”243   
2. Civilian Leadership Incentives 
Opposite the military, Chilean civilians derive numerous benefits from 
peacekeeping.  First and foremost, PKOs increase civil-military dialogue.   In recent 
history, Chile took great strides in building civil-military rapport.  As stated earlier, 
measures implemented include increasing advanced degrees at the War Academy to 
publication of the Defense White Book.  Peacekeeping strengthens these past trends.  
Dialogue between senior civilian defense officials and military personnel is now 
commonplace.  As proof, in March 2005 Minister Bachelet met with troops at the Naval 
Academy in order to explain the concept and evolution of PKOs, Chile’s global economic 
policy and the military’s subordinated role.  The Minister emphasized “the traditional 
agenda of conflict is shrinking” while “the international crisis requiring peace operations 
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are incredibly important.”244  Next, Minister Bachelet addressed the first 300 Chileans 
troops deploying to Haiti.  The Minister highlighted again the role between international 
stability and domestic prosperity.  She states, “Under the conditions of a strategy of open 
development to the exterior and in the role of globalization, there is not a region in the 
world disconnected from the other.”245  By emphasizing Chile’s global nature, the 
military’s role within this scheme and continually reinforcing it, the Minister hopes to 
increase understanding between the bodies. 
In addition to speeches, top officials meet with units regularly.  In 2004, Minister 
Bachelet addressed troops deployed to the Rene Schneider military camp.  While visiting, 
she stressed the soldiers’ role in “the most important military operations the country has 
undertaken in recent times.”246  Continuing, on New Year’s Day 2004, Defense Minster 
Jaime Ravinet and the Subsecretary of War, Gabriel Gaspar, met with Chile’s helicopter 
group.  The ministers, pilots, and maintainers shared a “lunch of camaraderie.”247  Later 
in the day the ministers dined with the majority of armed forces deployed in Haiti.  
Lastly, Minister Ravinet toured a forward deployed hospital controlled by the CINC of 
logistic battalion “Bellavista” General Javier Urbina Paredes.  The tour resulted in 
General Paredes admitting “[this hospital] is not only for the army, but for all of the 
country.”248  The visits, in chorus with the increased dialogue, promote civil-military 
trust. 
A second government benefit from PKOs for the Chilean government is military 
subordination.  The increased training and oversight the military receives as a result of 
PKOs inculcates respect for and subordination to civilian authorities.  In order to 
facilitate these values domestically, the Minister of Defense established the Centro 
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Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC) in July of 2002.249  Designed to 
emulate the successful Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada, CECOCPAC teaches 
civilians and military personnel how to function in an international environment, comply 
with UN doctrine and increase civil-military trust.250  Courses required for civilians and 
military alike include General Knowledge of the UN, Human rights, Use of Force (ROE), 
Civil-Military Cooperation, Cultural Awareness and Stress management.251  Designed 
and controlled by civilians, CECOPACS indoctrinates the hundreds of civilian and 
military graduates to better function together.   
Civilian oversight bodies reinforce training received by graduates of CECOPAZ.  
For example, the MINUSTAH Mandate for Contributing Nations stipulates forces must 
support “Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and 
protect human rights…in order to ensure individual accountability.”252  Compliance with 
the mandate is monitored and reported by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.  The Commission collects the information on Chile’s 
compliance and disseminates it internationally.  This independent oversight and control 
increases military transparency. 
Lastly, the Chilean government boosts their international presence economically 
and diplomatically through peacekeeping.  In addressing the former, the Chilean 
government understands PKOs provide global stability which aids domestic economy.  
When briefing the Chilean Naval Academy, Minister Bachelet stated, “we have 
transitioned from a model of international development to a full, active, and deeply 
integrated world model and because of that we are more interdependent and sensible to 
the evolution of the international environment.”253   Building on this theme, Bachelet 
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noted, “More than half of Chile’s income is from exports, for that Chile must participate 
in the construction of security and international stability.”254  In light of these comments, 
Chile’s recent free-trade agreements (FTA) with the European Union and the United 
States and their forthcoming FTA with China only increase the importance of 
international stability.255  Reliant on exports and global stability, PKOs perform a vital 
function for Chile’s. 
Additionally, Chile uses peacekeeping to boost its diplomatic presence.  Minister 
Bachelet openly stated in a 2002 speech entitled Peacekeeping Operations: Evaluation 
and perspectives of political defense, Chile was a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council of the United Nations in the early nineties and “aspires to be that again in 
2003.256  Not surprisingly, the UN re-approved Chile’s council seat on 1 January 2003. 
Next, following Chile’s involvement in Haiti, former foreign minister Juan Gabriel 
Valdés became the ranking UN member in Haiti as Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
special representative.  Continuing, Chile became a member of the UN’s Commission on 
Human Rights from 2002-2004.257  Lastly, Chile's former Interior Minister, José Miguel 
Insulza, became the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States in 2005.  
Chile’s string of international diplomatic victories and Chile’s increasing peacekeeping 
presence are no coincidence.  As noted by Minister Bachelet, Chile leverages political 
capital from PKOs to garner international favor. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, PKOs provide incentives to civilian elites and the military enticing 
them into a stable civil-military arrangement.  For the elites, motivations include civil-
military dialogue, subordinate armed forces and international prestige.  The military  
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receives a mission, budgets, personnel pay, training, material incentives, and morale.  
Both sides’ benefits boost regional stability, providing a stable economic environment 
and reinforcing the structure. 
In the Chilean case, the military and government attain the majority, if not all of, 
the theoretical advantages.  For the civilians, PKOs increase civil-military dialogue, 
provide the military a mission, increase transparency and oversight of operations as well 
as project Chile on a global stage.  An economy built on exports and a foreign policy 
reliant on free trade agreements and political capital reinforces the policies.  For the 
armed forces, peacekeeping justifies the constitutionally guaranteed budgets.  In the wake 
of Pinochet’s trial and the judiciaries’ prosecutions of senior officers, PKO legitimize the 
alienated yet powerful Chilean military.  Personal pay increases, UN concessions and 
international interaction sweeten the pot.  Demonstrated by Chile’s growing dedication to 
PKOs, both sides will remain committed to the stable arrangement.  The question 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has shown that Chile’s threat environment does not justify current 
military budgets.  Following the democratic transition, analysts argued that an 
authoritarian hangover maintained expenditures.  General Pinochet’s arrest, trial and 
discredit and the resulting overhaul of civil-military relations invalidated these theories.  
This thesis argues, instead, Chilean defense expenditures are a result of a mutually 
beneficial civil-military arrangement based in part on peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as 
an important new mission for Chile.  Beneficial to both sides, PKOs provide the civilian 
elites military subordination and international prestige while justifying the military’s 
mission and budgets.  As such, PKOs will remain a cornerstone of Chilean defense 
policy. 
The thesis’ central question is: Why does the Chilean government continue to 
fund the military in excess of its threat environment?  Conventionally, Chile maintained 
high military budgets to defend expansive borders with hostile Argentina, Peru and 
Bolivia.  However, the resolution of almost all of its outstanding border conflicts since 
the transition to democracy and the political and economic hard times that have wreaked 
havoc on the defense budgets of Chile's neighbors have greatly reduced these external 
threats.  Nonetheless, Chile dedicates a higher percentage of their GDP to defense 
expenditures than any other Latin American state.   
The disproportionate defense budgets can be explained by domestic political 
factors.  Following the democratic transition and until Pinochet’s arrest, analysts 
attributed the high budgets to the 1980 constitution and the influence of the military as a 
political actor.  The constitution defined a prominent role for the armed forces and 
insulated budgets through the Copper Law and spending guarantees.  Until 1998, the 
parties of the right and the senators designated by the outgoing authoritarian government 
blocked the governing Concertación's constitutional reform efforts by pooling their votes 
in the senate.  However, Pinochet’s arrest in 1998 initiated a civil-military reversal. The 
judiciary prosecuted human rights abuses, the right distanced themselves from the 
military, and more open minded military leadership came to power.  The Concertación 
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allied with the newly reformist right in order to “complete” the constitutional reforms by 
eradicating the authoritarian enclaves.  Nevertheless, constitutional spending guarantees 
remained and military budgets reached their highest levels ever.   
This thesis attributes the high budgets to a process of “normalization” of civil-
military relations.  New military leadership acknowledged human rights abuses and 
pledged subordination to civilian authority.  In return, the civilians omitted the spending 
guarantees from the constitutional reforms and military budgets remained high.  The 
question then becomes, is the situation stable or will the civilians reduce spending in the 
future? 
This thesis argues that relatively high defense spending is likely to continue into 
the future since it serves the interests of both military and civilian elites.  For the armed 
forces, PKOs increase budgets, personnel pay and morale at a low cost with additional 
material and cross-training benefits.  For civilians, PKOs augment civil-military dialogue, 
provide a conventional and subordinate external mission for the armed forces and boost 
international prestige.  Benefiting both sides, Chile peacekeeping commitment grew from 
a handful of observers in 1998 to over 600 troops in Haiti by 2005.  Looking to the 
future, diminished conventional threats in the post-Cold War environment and Chile’s 
internationally oriented foreign and economic policy increase the value of the 
peacekeeping benefits.  Barring major policy shifts, Chile’s commitment to PKOs should 
grow. 
As such, the United States government should recognize and support Chile’s 
endeavors.  First, peacekeeping helps cement improving civil-military relations in Chile. 
Although civil-military relations have greatly improved since 1990, civilian governments 
have not been able to consolidate control over the armed forces since the transition to 
democracy.  By supporting Chilean PKOs, the United States can contribute to this 
process, possibly serving as a model for civil-military reform throughout Latin America.  
Second and related to the last point, PKOs further consolidate democracy in Chile.  PKOs 
increase civil-military dialogue, transparency and familiarity and compliance with 
international law.  Resultantly, increased Chilean peacekeeping participation fortifies  
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democracy.  A consolidated Chilean democracy is important to Latin America as it may 
serve as an anchor against the destabilizing effects of the Andean region and Hugo 
Chavez. 
Furthermore, the United States military has much to gain from future Chilean 
PKOs.  Peacekeeping justifies high Chilean defense budgets, leading to equipment 
upgrades and a viable weapons market.  As seen with the purchase of General Dynamics 
F-16’s, the Chileans desire American technology.  Equipment purchased from the United 
States promotes interoperability.  The ability to integrate with American forces reduces 
logistic strain and promotes effectiveness in joint PKOs.  Also, joint peacekeeping 
missions bolster international dialogue, information and trust between the nations.  In 
short, the United States receives a highly trained and effective military ally and Chileans 
the international prestige they desire.  
The United States can facilitate Chilean involvement in PKOs through a number 
of measures.  First, the United States should maintain its policy of advanced weapon sales 
to Chile.  The improved regional relations and Chile's posture of updating outdated 
military equipment reduces the likelihood of an arms race.  Second, the United States 
should continue and/or increase funding for PKOs.  The civil-military reforms initiated 
within partner states and the closer international relations formed between the United 
States and regional allies due to PKOs outstrip the associated costs.  Third, the United 
States should continue to publicly recognize nations participating in PKOs.  As 
demonstrated by Argentina and Chile, diplomatic recognition and political capital spurn 
peacekeeping participation and its associated benefits.  Lastly, the United States should 
support Chile's efforts to assume a leadership role in PKOs and the region.  Chile has 
demonstrated it is a capable regional leader through its participation in the Organization 
of American States and in its role in NATO's MINUSTAH mission in Haiti.  Chile's 
increased weapons capability and leadership role will increase its peacekeeping capacity 
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